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Summary findings
Blomstrom  and  Kokko  discuss  how  regional  investment  the integrating  region,  and  the motives  for  foreign  direct
agreements  may  affect  the inward  and  outward  flows of  investment  in and  by the country  or  region  in question.
foreign  direct  investments  in the  integrating  region.  After  The  creation  of the  Canada-U.S.  Free Trade
describing  the multidimensional  character  of the issue,  Agreement  (CUSFTA),  for example,  had  relatively  little
they  provide  a conceptual  framework  for analysis  as well  influence  on  direct  investment  patterns  in Canada,  since
as three  case  studies  focused  on different  kinds  of  much  of the trade  between  Canada  and the  United  States
regional  integration:  had been  liberalized  long  before  the CUSFTA  was
*  North-North  integration  (Canada  joining  the  established.
CUSFTA).  By contrast,  the Mexican  accession  to  the NAFTA
*  North-South  integration  (Mexico's  accession  to the  brought  about  significant  policy  chaniges, which  help  to
NAFTA).  explain  foreign  multinationals'  increasing  interest  in the
*  South-South  integration  (MERCOSUR).  country.
They  conclude  that  the  response  to an  integration  Similarly,  the establishment  of the  MERCOSIJR
agreement  will,  in each  case,  depend  on the  Common  Market  is likely  to significantly  affect  the
environmental  change  brought  about  by the  regional  region's  policy  environment,  which  suggests  that  it may
investment  agreements,  the  locational  advantage  of the  have a notable  (although  varying)  impact  on foreign
country  or  region,  the  competitiveness  of local  firms in  direct  investment  in the four  member  countries.
T'his paper-a  product  of the International  Trade Division,  International  Economics  Department-is  part of a larger effort
in the departrment  to study  regionalism  and development.  Copies  of the paper  are available  free from the World  Bank, 1 818
H Street  NW, Washington,  DC  20433.  Please contactJennifer  Ngaine,  room  N5-060,  telephone  202-473-7947,  fax 202-
522-1159,  Internet  address  trade(a'worldbank.org.  April  1997.  (46 pages)
The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work  in progress to encourage the exchange of  ideas about
development issues.  An objective of the series  is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The
papers carry the natnes of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this
paper are entirely those of the authors. They do not necessarily  represent the view of  the World Bank, its Executive Directors, or the
countries they represent.
Produccd  by the  Policy Research  Disscmination  CenterRegional Integration and Foreign Direct Investment:
A Conceptual Framework and Three Cases
Magnus Blomstr6m
Stockholm School of Economics, NBER and CEPR
Ari Kokko
Stockholm School of Economics
Magnus Blomstr6im  Ari Kokko
Stockholm School of Economics  Stockholm School of Economics
PO Box 6501  PO Box 6501
113 83  Stockholm, Sweden  113 83 Stockholm, Sweden
E-mail: gmbghhs.se  E-mail: gak(hhs.se
and
NBER and CEPRForeword
As regional trading arrangements (RTAs) have spread, enlarged and deepened over the last
decade, they have posed challenges to economists on both intellectual and policy levels. On the
former, do RTAs stimulate growth and investment,  facilitate technology transfer, shift comparative
advantage towards high value-added activities, provide credibility to reform programs, or induce
political stability and cooperation? Or do they, on the other hand, divert trade in inefficient
directions and undermine the multilateral trading system?
The answer is probably "all of these things, in different proportions according to the
particular circumstances of each RTA." This then poses the policy challenge of how best to
manage RTAs in order to get the best balance of benefits and costs. For example, should technical
standards be harmonized and, if so, how; do direct or indirect taxes need to be equalized; how
should RTAs manage their international trade policies in an outward-looking fashion?
Addressing these issues is one important focus of the research program of the International
Trade Division of the World Bank. It has produced a number of methodological innovations in the
traditional area of trade effects of RTAs and is now starting to tackle four new areas of research: the
dynamics of regionalism (e.g., convergence,  growth, investment, industrial location and migration),
deep integration (standards, tax harmonization), regionalism and the rest of the world (including its
effects on the multilateral trading system), and certain political economy dimensions of regionalism
(e.g., credibility and the use of RTAs as tools of diplomacy).
In addition to thematic work, the program includes a number of studies of specific regional
arrangements, conducted in collaboration with the Regional Vice Presidencies of the Bank.  Several
EU-Mediterranean Association Agreements have been studied and a joint program with the staff of
the Latin American and Caribbean Region entitled "Making  the Most of Mercosur"  is under way.
Future work is planned on African and Asian regional integration schemes.
Regionalism and Development findings have been and will, in future, be released in a
number of outlets. Recent World Bank Policy Research Working Papers concerning these issues
include:
Glenn Harrison, Tom Rutherford and David Tarr, "Economic Implications for Turkey
of a Customs Union with the European Union," (No. 1599).
Maurice Schiff, "Small is Beautiful, Preferential Trade Agreements and the Impact of
Country Size, Market Share, Efficiency and Trade Policy," (No. 1668).
L. Alan Winters, "Regionalism versus Multilateralism,"  (No. 1687).
Planned future issues in this series include:
Eric Bond, "An Operational Model for Assessing Preferential Trading Arrangements"
Sherry Stephenson, "Standards, Conformity Assessments and Developing Countries"Maurice Schiff and L. Alan Winters, "Regional Integration as Diplomacy"
Magnus Blomstr6m and Ari Kokko, "The Impact of Foreign Investment on Host
Countries: A Review of the Empirical Evidence"
Anthony Venables and Diego Puga, "Trading Arrangements and Industrial
Development"
L. Alan Winters and Won Chang, "Integration and Non-Member Welfare: Measuring
the Price Effects"
Glenn Harrison, Thomas Rutherford and David Tarr, "Trade Policy Options for Chile:
A Quantitative Evaluation"
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Claudio Frischtak, Danny M. Leipziger and John F. Normand, "Industrial Policy in
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1. Introduction
Recent  years have witnessed  a deepening  and widening  of European  integration  and a
proliferation  of new regional  integration  agreements  (RIAs)  throughout  the world,  with acronyms
such as APEC,  EU, MERCOSUR,  and NAFTA  attracting  increasing  attention.  Although  some
integration  agreements  have  been motivated  by political  considerations,  it is clear that economics
is generally  the driving  force:  countries  enter into RIAs  because  integration  promises  various
economic  benefits.  In the short  run, integration  is expected  to stimulate  intra-regional  trade and
investment;  in the longer run, it is hoped that  the combination  of larger  markets,  tougher
competition,  more efficient  resource  allocation,  and various  positive externalities  will raise the
growth  rates of the participating  economies.  This paper  focuses  on the investment  effects of
RIAs,  and discusses  how such  arrangements  may affect  inward  and outward  foreign  direct
investment  (FDI)  flows in the integrating  region.  In this context,  we will interpret  regional
integration  to mean a reduction  of regional  trade barriers  and investment  restrictions.  With
foreign  direct investment,  we refer  to foreign  ownership  of a controlling  share  of a firm  operating
Thanks are due to Maurice  Schiff  and Alan Winters  at the World  Bank and Robert  Lipsey  at the
NBER for useful discussions  and comments  on an earlier  draft  of the paper. We have also
benefited  from detailed  discussions  and joint work  on related  topics with Steven  Globerman.  The
standard  disclaimer  applies.
2in a country's  domestic market: FDI flows refer to changes in the foreign ownership of
production factors.
The perhaps most serious problem in the study of the relation between regional
integration and foreign direct investment is the multi-dimensional character of the issue. For
instance, it is reasonable to expect that regional integration will have different impacts on
investors from the participating economies and outside investors. The impact may vary
depending on the character of existing foreign direct investment: horizontal and vertical
investment, or import-substituting and export-oriented investment, are not likely to be affected in
the same manner by the elimination of trade and investment barriers. The major home countries,
i.e. the countries where multinational corporations (MNCs) have their home bases, may
experience different effects than the countries hosting foreign MNCs. Integration between
developed countries (North-North integration) may differ from integration between developing
countries (South-South integration) or agreements between countries at different levels of
development (North-South integration), depending on how competitive and complementary the
economies are. The time dimension may be important, so that static effects differ significantly
from dynamic effects. The degree of integration at the outset, and the significance and nature of
the changes brought about by the RIA will also matter. In addition, the patterns of trade and
investment before the RIA are important determinants of how much adjustment is necessary after
the agreement. For these reasons, we will attempt to set up a conceptual framework for the analysis,
and to cover several different integration cases in the empirical part of the paper.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section discusses, in broad theoretical terms,
how regional integration can potentially affect investment  patterns among countries. Section 3
reviews some earlier empirical studies of the relation between RIAs and FDI and presents three
case studies focusing on different kinds of regional integration: North-North integration (Canada
joining CUSFTA), North-South integration (Mexico's accession to NAFTA), and South-South
integration (MERCOSUR). Section 4 provides a brief summary and some tentative conclusions.
32. Regional Integration Agreements and FDI: Some Theoretical Considerations
To identify and assess some theoretical linkages between RIAs and incentives  to undertake FDI, it
is convenient to structure the discussion according to the motives for FDI. The reason is that
conclusions regarding effects of regional integration are likely to differ significantly depending on
why firms invest abroad. Hence, we begin by discussing the situation where FDI is mainly a
response to trade barriers, and go on to consider cases where FDI is primarily motivated by the
need to internalize firm-specific intangible assets that cannot be traded efficiently in arm's-length
markets. It should be noted that these categories are not mutually exclusive - in particular, all cases
of import-substituting FDI necessarily involve some internalization of firm-specific intangible
assets. However, the distinction is analytically convenient,  both because it reflects the evolution of
our understanding of the motives for FDI, and because one of the main effects of regional
integration is to reduce regional trade barriers. Obviously, this classification of FDI disregards some
other common characterizations of foreign investment, such as strict distinctions between import-
substituting and export-oriented projects, or horizontally and vertically integrated investments, but
we will touch upon some of these distinctions in the course of the analysis.
Thereafter, we consider the impact of special investment  provisions and institutional
changes that are sometimes connected to integration agreements.  The focus in this discussion lies
on the static effects of RIAs on FDI flows: the possible dynamic effects of regional integration on
investmnent  flows are discussed separately. Finally, we suggest a template for classifying entire
countries and specific sectors according to the expected impact on investments. It should be noted
already at the outset that the discussion will not address the welfare effects of changes in
investment flows. Although the underlying assumption  is that increased FDI flows are beneficial to
growth and development in the integrating region, it should be recognized that the welfare effects
on the region may in fact be negative if the RIA worsens the allocation of resources or adds new
distortions, e.g. in the form of higher average protection of the regional market.' In addition, the
welfare effects on the rest of the world may well be negative if the RIA diverts investment from
other countries to the region in question.
lFor  a classic reference, see Brecher and Diaz-Alej  andro (1977).
42.1 FDI and Barriers to Trade
The early theoretical and empirical literature on foreign investment tended to regard trade and
capital movements as substitutable modes of serving foreign markets.  This view of the relationship
between trade and factor mobility encouraged the perspective that tariff barriers could motivate
import-substituting FDI, and that general tariff reductions would reduce FDI flows or even
stimulate a "repatriation" of foreign-owned assets to the home countries of MNCs. Outward direct
investment would be discouraged by foreign tariff reductions, on the margin, as the cost of
exporting (e.g. related to tariffs) decreased relative to the cost of establishing and operating foreign
affiliates. The same relation was presumed between exporting and non-tariff barriers. Effective non-
tariff barriers require firms to establish affiliates abroad, or to license foreign producers in order to
supply products to foreign markets. Trade agreements  which reduce or eliminate non-tariff barriers
were therefore expected to make exporting a more viable international business mode and
discourage FDI, other things constant.
However, although reductions in tariff and non-tariff barriers are major features of all RIAs,
it is less obvious what the simple models predict when we consider regional rather than global trade
liberalization. The reason is that investments made by "insiders" and "outsiders" would be affected
in different ways by regional integration. Looking first at intra-regional FDI from the "tariff-
jumping" perspective, we would, on the one hand, expect reduced investment flows because trade
liberalization makes exporting from the home country relatively more attractive than FDI as a way
to serve the regional market. On the other hand, if regional integration results in trade creation, it is
likely that changes in the regional production structure are required, which would motivate a
shifting of investment from one participating country to another. Hence, intra-regional FDI in some
member countries might well increase in response to the emergence of these new investment
opportunities. The extent of cross-border investment of course depends on the relative strength of
2 See e.g. Mundell (1957), Corden (1967), Johnson (1967), Brecher and Diaz Alejandro (1977),
Bhagwati and Brecher (1980), and Bhagwati and Tironi (1980). Note, however, that these
authors, writing in the Heckscher-Ohlin tradition, seldom refer specifically to foreign direct
investment: the strict distinction between FDI and foreign portfolio investment did not become
essential until it was recognized that the exploitation of firm-specific intangible assets is a major
motive for FDI whereas portfolio investment is mainly motivated by international differences in
capital yields.
5the firms in the different member countries: FDI flows would tend to be relatively small if the firms
that are best positioned to exploit the situation are already based in the favored production location.
This potential impact on intra-regional FDI flows has been termed "investment diversion" by
Kindleberger (1966).
Turning to inter-regional FDI flows, the simple model suggest stronger reasons to expect
increases. The inflows of FDI from "outsiders" into the region could obviously go up if the average
level of protection increases as a result of the RIAs. The inflows of foreign capital might also
increase if the volume of incoming FDI was initially restricted by the limited size of the individual
national markets. Contrary to the national markets, the integrated "common" market may be large
enough to bear the fixed costs for the establishment of new foreign affiliates. This surge of inward
FDI would probably not be evenly distributed, but rather concentrated to the geographical areas
with the strongest locational advantages. In addition, Kindleberger (1966) has pointed to
"investment creation" as a likely response to the trade diversion brought about by RIAs. The term
refers to the strategic investment responses by outside firms who lose export markets when their
former customers turn to suppliers based in the region, because regional trade is free from tariffs. 3
However, it is also possible to picture situations where RIAs could cause a reduction of FDI from
outside the region. Specifically, if the initial stock of outside FDI consists of horizontally organized
affiliates in several or all of the countries in the region, it is not likely that this structure would be
optimal after the establishment of the RIA. A possible response to integration could then be a
rationalization of the network of affiliates, so that the entire region could be supplied from a smaller
number of affiliates located in the member countries with the most favorable economic conditions.
In this case -which is similar to Kindleberger's (1966) investmnent  diversion case - some countries
could experience disinvestments as foreign MNCs concentrate their regional operations in other
member countries. On balance, however, it appears that the arguments in favor of increased FDI
inflows from outside the RIA are stronger.
The potential effects of RIA on outflows of FDI from the integrating region are rarely
discussed in simple theoretical models. This is mainly related to an assumption that nothing
3 Hence, Kindleberger (1966) defines "investment diversion" as a response to "trade creation",
while "investment creation" is a response to "trade diversion".
6happens with trade barriers in the rest of the world. However, some changes in outward FDI are
feasible even when trade policies in the rest of the world remain unchanged. For instance, it is
possible that a fim's  capacity to undertake new FDI projects is restricted by its administrative
capability or the availability of investment capital (Stevens and Lipsey 1992; Belderbos 1992). In
that case, it is likely that FDI within and outside the region are substitutes. Since integration reduces
intra-regional FDI when trade and FDI are substitutes, it may also increase the scope for outflows
of FDI from the integrating area to other regions..
Hence, theoretical models assuming that trade barriers are the main motive for FDI suggest
that aggregate intra-regional investment flows are likely to fall following regional integration.
However, investment diversion may contribute to increased intra-regional FDI in some countries.
The conclusions regarding inflows of FDI from the rest of the world to the integrating region are
also somewhat ambiguous, although the most likely result is an increase in FDI. Given free trade
within the RIA, the location of the new investments will be detennined by the comparative
advantages of the countries participating  in the integration agreement. It is therefore not possible to
make any general conclusions regarding the net impact on individual countries in the RIA. In
addition, it is possible that the outflows of FDI from the integrating area increase, in particular if
foreign investments were initially restricted by some capacity constraint.
2.2 Internalizing Firm-Specific Intangible Assets
There is no doubt that significant amounts of FDI have been, and are still, motivated by tariff-
jumping arguments. However, the view that avoiding trade barriers is the main reason for FDI has
become increasingly questioned over time. One important theoretical development in the literature
on multinational corporations and FDI is the recognition that the exploitation of intangible assets is
often a major motive for foreign investment (see Caves 1996 for a review). In order to compete
successfully in a foreign market - where local firms have superior knowledge of the local market,
consumer preferences, and business practices -the internationally oriented company must possess
some firm-specific intangible asset that gives them a competitive edge. Technological and
marketing expertise are examples of such intangible assets. The effective exploitation of these
assets sometimes requires firms to "internalize" their international operations by establishing
7foreign affiliates, since other modes of international  business, including exports and licensing of
technology to foreign firms, carry relatively high transactions costs (Buckley and Casson 1976;
Dunning 1977). Hence, some FDI can be expected to occur even when there are no formal trade
barriers between countries. One indication of the relative importance of "internalization" and tariff-
jumping as motives for FDI is that the bulk of investment  flows take place between OECD
countries, where both tariff and non-tariff barriers are relatively low.
Consequently, regional integration in the form of trade liberalization would not create
incentives to reduce investment or repatriate capital for projects that were primarily undertaken to
internalize the exploitation of intangible assets. In fact, the reduction of trade barriers could instead
stimulate overall FDI flows among the relevant trading partners by enabling MNCs to operate more
efficiently across international borders. This argument applies in particular for vertically integrated
FDI, where the operations of the MvNC's  different affiliates are specialized according to the
locational advantages of the host country, and where a predictable and liberal trade environment is
a prerequisite for the international division of labor at the firm level.
As in the models where trade barriers motivate FDI, internalization theories imply that
inflows of FDI from outsiders are likely to increase as a result of regional integration: the larger
market makes the region a more attractive investmnent  location. How large the increases FDI flows
will be depends on how strong regional firms are compared to outside firms. The internalization
motive for FDI does not provide any clear predictions regarding the effects of RIAs on outward
FDI from the integrating region, at least not in a static context. As in the case with tariff-jumping
FDI, however, it is possible that FDI within and outside the region are substitutes, in which case the
most likely effect is that the increases in intra-regional investment reduce the scope for foreign
investment outside the region.
Hence, recognizing that there are other motives for FDI than tariff-jumping and trade
barriers, it is reasonable to abandon one of the few conclusion from simple models of FDI and
integration, namely, that aggregate intra-regional FDI is likely to fall as a result of reduced trade
barriers. To the extent that FDI is motivated by high transactions costs on arm's-length markets for
technology and other intangible assets, regional integration is instead likely to raise regional FDI
flows. Adding the expected positive effects on inflows of FDI from outsiders provides a rather
8positive picture of the potential investmnent  effects of regional integration. However, we are still not
able to say anything general regarding the investment effects on individual countries -FDI can be
expected to cluster to those parts of the RIA where the investment environment is most favorable,
and some countries may therefore be left with less FDI than before.
2.3 Explicit Investment Provisions and Other Influences
To the extent that RIAs also liberalize capital flows, an additional stimulus is provided to the FDI
process. Capital flows can be liberalized in several ways. Most directly, restrictions on inward
foreign direct investment might be reduced or eliminated. Inward FDI would also presumably be
encouraged by "national treatment" provisions ensuring that foreign investors are treated no less
favorably than domestic investors. Obviously, the practical relevance (to the FDI process) of such
provisions in integration agreements will depend upon the scope and magnitude of pre-existing
barriers to inward FDI, as well as the extent and nature of host government discrimination against
foreign investors.
Inward FDI could also be stimulated by the elimination of trade-related investment
measures (TRIMs), such as requirements for foreign affiliates to satisfy specific export targets, and
by the presence of strong investor property rights which reduce the risk of direct or indirect
expropriation. The reduction of TRIMs should make it more profitable for MNCs to establish
affiliates in the host country. Stronger property rights should encourage inward direct investment by
reducing non-systematic risk facing foreign investors. Both types of initiatives may be
institutionalized in RIAs. In this context, it is possible that a significant effect of some RIAs may be
that they "lock in" economic reforms in the participating  countries. By raising reform decision
from the national to the international level, the agreements  may create a more predictable policy
environment for foreign investors, who might otherwise fear that purely national reform efforts are
temporary and that various kinds of restrictions may be reintroduced when the political regime
changes. These effects are likely to be most important in connection with North-South agreements,
where the southern partners may benefit both from a more credible policy environment and access
to the markets of the northern partner countries, and South-South agreements, where increased
policy credibility is perhaps the major benefit. In addition, it is possible that regional integration
9encourages economic reform and openness by removing a source of uncertainty that would face
individual countries considering reforms. The short-run political success of unilateral liberalization
depends to some extent on the responses of the country's trade partners, since market-opening
reforms that are not reciprocated may cause macroeconomic  problems, such as trade deficits and
unemployment. Regional integration entails the coordination  of reforms and guarantees some
degree of reciprocity. 4
Explicit dispute resolution mechanisms are also featured in many integration agreements.
To the extent that such mechanisms are effective, they should reduce trade and investment disputes
between nations covered by the relevant agreement(s).  Concerns about trade disputes disintegrating
into "trade wars" marked by the escalating use of countervailing duties and the like are effectively
non-tariff barriers, and our earlier discussion of the implications of reducing trade barriers more
generally is relevant here. In response to a contentious trade environment, MNCs might favor
serving foreign markets through host country affiliates rather than by exporting from the home
country. In these cases, effective dispute resolution mechanisms might encourage a repatriation of
capital to home countries. However, they should also encourage increased vertical specialization on
the part of MNCs, since the associated inter-affiliate  trade flows are less likely to be disrupted by
trade disputes between host governments. The impact on any individual country of these
institutional reforms depends upon pre-existing conditions. For example, if a country was much
more likely to be the victim of protectionist initiatives rather than the initiator, it would likely be
seen as the primary beneficiary of a more harnonious trading environment. It is therefore likely to
be an above-average recipient of increased investment flows. Moreover, to the extent that "market
forces" become a stronger influence on capital investment decisions compared to political risk,
international differences in factor endowments should become stronger influences on investment
location decisions. This strengthens the tendency for FDI to be concentrated to the most attractive
investment locations in the integrating area.
Simple integration agreements ordinarily do not seek to harmonize monetary and fiscal
regimes, although more ambitious forms of integration, e.g. the European Union, are quite
4 This may be particularly important if the countries participating in the agreements wish to avoid
competing devaluations - unilateral reforms are often connected with devaluations, in order to
limit the expected surge in imports and provide incentives for export oriented production.
10concerned with harmonizing these broader aspects of economic and social policy. However, it is
not obvious what fiscal coordination or more or less stability in exchange rate relationships imply
for the FDI process. In this context, we will not discuss these types of reforms in detail, but rather
define regional integration to consist mainly of trade liberalization and reforms of the investment
regime. To the extent that future RIAs focus more heavily on fiscal and monetary coordination, it
will of course be necessary to complement the present analysis with these issues.
2.4 Dynamic Effects of Regional Integration
The discussion has, so far, been concerned with the static effects of RIAs on FDI flows. On
balance, we have concluded that RIAs are likely to make the integrating region more attractive to
outside investors, and that there are arguments for expecting increases in intra-regional investments
as well. These conclusions follow from the assumption that internalization of firm-specific
intangible assets, rather than avoidance of trade barriers, is the dominant motive for FDI. Moreover,
it is assumed that the large regional market will be a more attractive investment location for foreign
MNCs than the fragmented national markets separately.
No such conclusions can be made for individual countries within the RIAs, since there is no
reason to expect that the investment increases are evenly distributed across the integrating region.
By reducing or eliminating trade barriers within the region, regional integration would presumably
encourage a substantial reallocation of production resources to more closely reflect patterns of
regional comparative advantages. That is, thanks to the easier - and guaranteed - access to the
integrated market, production capacity in different activities would become more highly
concentrated in those regions where each activity is most efficiently carried out.
In addition to these static effects, it is possible that the establishment of RIAs also generates
various dynamic effects that affect FDI flows. For instance, analyses of the economic impact of the
European Single Market have argued that this specific integration  process has led to significant
efficiency benefits that may raise the participating  countries' growth rates over the medium or long
term. These dynamic benefits might increase the attractiveness  of the integrated region as a location
for domestic as well as foreign investment -the quantitative  impact on foreign investment depends
on whether foreign or domestic firms possess the competitive assets needed to exploit the growing
11market.  The higher  growth  rates  may  be temporary,  lasting  while  the economies  adjust  to the higher
real income  that comes  about  because  of tougher  competition  and more  efficient  allocation  of
resources  in the common  market  (see  e.g. Emerson  et al. 1989).  It is also possible  that there  are
permanent  growth  effects  that occur  as the initial gains  in efficiency  and output  raise factor  rewards
and generate  new savings  and investments  that contribute  further  to output  growth  (Baldwin  1989).
However,  the exact  links between  regional  integration  and dynamic  growth  effects  are not well
specified,  and it is not uncommon  that  analyses  and  empirical  estimates  of dynamic  benefits  are
considered  vague  or speculative  (Smith  1992).
In many  instances,  foreign  direct  investment  may  actually  be an essential  catalyst  for these
dynamic  benefits.  Some  of the improvements  in economic  efficiency  associated  with increased
specialization,  exploitation  of scale  economies,  and  greater  geographical  concentration  of
individual  economic  activities  are likely  to be driven  by inter  and intra-regional  FDI. Increased  FDI
flows  are also  important  forces  behind  the heavier  competitive  pressure  that is expected  to
encourage  local  producers  to adopt  efficiency-enhancing  strategies,  such  as rationalizing  plant
capacity  or reducing  slack  in the production  process  (Smith  and  Venables  1989).  In addition,  it is
likely  that FDI will stimulate  technology  transfer  and  diffusion,  both directly  and through  spillovers
to local  firms.
As noted  earlier,  multinationals  are distinguished  from already  established  firms in the host
country  because  they bring  with them some  intangible  asset -e.g. technology  - that allows  them
to compete  successfully  with local firms.  There is plenty  of case  study evidence  to show  that
some  of these intangible  assets  may spill  over  to local  firms,  e.g. as foreign  multinationals
demonstrate  new products  and  technologies,  provide  technical  assistance  to their  local suppliers  and
customers,  and  train workers  and managers  who are later  employed  by local  fimns  (see Blomstrom
and Kokko  1996  for a survey).  Spillovers  may  be particularly  important  in the present  context,
because  they  provide  a possible  reason  why  regional  integration  may  result  in permanently  higher
growth  rates  and "dynamic"  benefits.  Traditional  growth  models  predict  only  temporary  changes  in
growth  rates as a result  of a more  efficient  allocation  of resources,  since  are all factors  are assumed
to exhibit  declining  marginal  returns.  As capital  is accumulated,  the rate of return  declines  until
further  investment  is no longer  profitable.  Adding  spillovers  to the picture,  it can be argued  that the
12accumulation of physical capital will coincide with increases in the stock of public knowledge.
Since more knowledge is available for all investors, investments in physical capital may actually
come to exhibit constant returns to scale. However, little formal work has been done on the
connection between spillovers and long-run growth, which means that discussion about possible
dynamic effects of regional integration on FDI flows remains rather speculative.
Furthermore, if regional integration creates a larger market, it is also conceivable that some
dynamic effects occur because regional integration influences various firm characteristics, such as
the stock of intangible firm-specific assets that facilitate FDI. A larger market may simply allow
some firms to grow larger and stronger than what would have been possible in individual national
markets. Alternatively, integration may motivate firms to seek strategic alliances or merge with
former competitors in order to manage in the more competitive  environment that is created when
intra-regional trade barriers are removed. As firms become larger, they may be able to invest more
in R&D and marketing, which may lead to the creation of new intangible assets that stimulate new
FDI, within as well as outside their own region.  Including this kind of dynamic considerations
into the analysis, it appears clear that there is a potential for significantly stronger effects on FDI
than what static models imply. The main impact of dynamic benefits of integration is to make the
integrating region a more attractive investment location, which should stimulate intra-regional FDI
flows as well as inflows from the rest of the world. If integration influences the regional industry's
average firm size, R&D intensity, marketing investments, and other firm characteristics  that are
thought to have some impact on the likelihood  that individual firms invest abroad, there may also
be dynamic effects that stimulate outflows of FDI from the integrating region. Concurrently, it
should be emphasized that foreign direct investment may be an important catalyst for several of the
dynamic benefits of integration that have been discussed in the literature on regional integration.
2.5 Synthesis of the Discussion
Clearly, some FDI has been, and continues to be, motivated primarily by the desire to get behind
trade barriers. Other FDI is motivated by foreign investors seeking to exploit input or output
markets located abroad in activities where operating a foreign affiliate is the most efficient
governance structure. Yet other investment projects are undertaken to reap economies of scale or
13specialization. In the discussion above, we have noted that regional integration is not likely to have
the same impact on all these types of FDI. For any individual country, the overall impact on
investment will therefore reflect potentially offsetting influences.
However, a reasonable generalization is that regional integration should enhance the
attractiveness of investing in the region as a whole by creating a larger common market and
contributing to improved overall efficiency and higher income levels in that market. The magnitude
of the changes in investment will be related to the significance and nature of the trade and
investment liberalization initiatives embodied in the RIA. The impacts on investment decisions are
also likely to vary across countries and industries. Countries characterized by relatively unprotected
and efficient domestic markets prior to regional integration are likely to enjoy the strongest
increases in foreign as well as domestic investment. The reason is that countries with low trade
barriers are not very likely to host import-substituting  foreign investment that might be withdrawn
or diverted to other locations as a result of regional integration. Concurrently, those sectors
characterized by high initial levels of trade protection combined with relatively weak locational
advantages may suffer decreases in investments by both foreign and domestically owned firms. The
ex ante structure of trade and investment flows is another determinant of the country and industry
specific responses to RIAs. Countries and industries that are already closely linked to their RIA
partners before the formal agreements - due to geography,  historical conditions, or other reasons -
are likely to face smaller changes than countries and industries with limited initial contacts with the
other participants in the RIA.
In addition to the distinctions we have made regarding the motives for FDI, it may therefore
be useful to specify a summary framework relating trade and investment liberalization initiatives to
country and industry characteristics.  Figure I provides an organizational  template for thinking
about the FDI process in the context of regional integration. The attribute labeled environmental
change summarizes the degree to which trade and investment flows are liberalized by the
integration agreements in question. This will, of course, depend both on the nature of the specific
agreement and the initial institutional environment in the region. As one moves down the rows of
Figure 1, the degree of liberalization is considered to be "weaker". The attribute labeled locational
advantage summarizes the degree to which it is advantageous from a profitability standpoint to
14locate an economic activity in a particular location. This characteristic refers to the availability and
cost of various production factors as well as the general macroeconomic environment. As one
moves across the columns (from left to right) in Figure 1, the locational advantages of a particular
country -in relation to other members in the RIA and the rest of the world - are presumed to be
weaker. Identifying the position of a specific country or industry in Figure 1, we will have a starting
point for analyzing the investment impact of regional integration. More detailed predictions
regarding FDI flows must, of course, also take into account trade and investment patterns prior to
integration, the motives for pre-existing FDI, the competitive strength of domestic versus foreign
firms, and so forth.
FIGURE 1. Classification Dimensions
Locational Advantages
(Positive to Negative =)
1  2
Environmental Change
(Strong to weak U)
3  4
Source: Globerman and Schwindt (1996).
The most pronounced positive impact on investment would presumably be experienced by those
economic sectors falling into area 1. These activities experience the strongest degree of integration,
and the country in question enjoys a strong locational advantage. Hence, for reasons noted earlier,
one would anticipate relatively strong, positive capital flows from both foreign and domestic
investors in these sectors. The degree to which the bulk of the new investments are actually made
by foreign investors rather than domestic investors depends, for instance, on how much foreign
investment there is already at the outset and whether firn-specific advantages in the expanding
industries are primarily enjoyed by foreign or domestic investors. An example of a case falling into
15area 1 could be the textile sector in a developing country entering into a RIA with an industrialized
country (i.e. a North-South agreement). The developing country could be expected to possess
strong competitive advantages, e.g. thanks to low wages, and the RIA could be expected to
constitute a significant change in the institutional environment, granting free access to the Northern
trading partner's market. If the necessary production technologies, marketing skills, and other
intangible assets are owned by Northern rather than Southern firms, we should expect significant
inflows of FDI to the developing country.
Turning to area 3, the impact on domestic investment  becomes weaker, albeit still positive.
Area 3 contains those economic activities for which the country in question has a strong locational
advantage, but for which the impact of the integration agreement is relatively weak. Economic
integration between OECD countries (North-North integration) can be expected to provide many
examples of industries falling in this category. One reasons is that the formal and informal barriers
to trade and investment are relatively low already at the outset, as a result of multilateral
agreements such as the GATT. Another reason for expecting relatively mild investment effects
from North-North integration is that several important industries, such as automobiles, are already
characterized by considerable  cross-investment between the major OECD countries. Moving to
area 2, the expected impact on inward FDI is negative and the potential for actual disinvestment
increases. Specifically, activities in area 2 can be characterized  as being strongly affected by the
integration agreement, but for which the country in question suffers locational disadvantages. Many
countries and industries where the bulk of existing FDI has been established in order to avoid trade
barriers would be classified in this area. Finally, in area 4, the potential impacts of integration on
capital investment are weak and, possibly, offsetting. While the country or industry in question
suffers a locational disadvantage in terms of the activities in area 4, the impacts of the integration
agreement on the overall economic environment are also quite weak. In other words, area 4
contains activities where investment decisions are not likely to be affected by the RIA, either
because the sector in question is excluded from the agreement (such as agriculture in the EFTA or
EEA agreements) or because the market is too small to attract the attention of foreign competitors.
In summary, any systematic attempt to evaluate the potential impact of RIAs on foreign
direct investment flows should acknowledge the key determinants of the "reaction functions" of
16MNCs and domestic investors as broadly represented by the axes in Figure 1. For any country, the
overall impact will be conditioned by the distribution of that country's economic activities across
the areas in Figure 1, as well as the trade and investment pattern at the outset and the competitive
strength of domestic versus foreign frmns.  As we have discussed above, theory offers few sharp
conclusions regarding the general impact of regional integration on investment. What happens is
essentially an empirical question.
3. Empirical Studies of Regional Integration and FDI
The theoretical discussion concluded that it is difficult (or even impossible) to make general
predictions regarding the results of RIAs on foreign direct investment decisions. The response to
an integration agreement will, in each individual case, depend on the environmental change
brought about by the RIA, the competitive strength of the country in question, and the motives
for foreign direct investment in and by the countiy in question. Consequently, effects are likely
to vary between small and large countries, countries that are homes and hosts to MNCs,
developed and developing countries, and different integration agreements.
In this section, we will review the empirical evidence on the investment effects of RIAs.
To cover as many as different outcomes as possible, we have chosen to examine the effects of
three distinct cases of regional integration:
a  North-North integration, as illustrated by the impact of the CUSFTA on Canada,
*  North-South integration, focusing on Mexican participation in the NAFTA, and
*  South-South integration, exemplified by the establishment of the MERCOSUR.
Before doing that, however, we will briefly summarize some earlier empirical studies of
RIAs and FDI.
3.1 The Early Evidence
Earlier work on regional integration and foreign direct investment have dealt mainly with the
effects of European integration on the size and structure of the activities of MNCs. 5 The period
5 Some exceptions to the European focus are early studies of Latin American integration,
including Behrman's (1972) study of LAFTA, Myltelka's (1979) study of the Andean Group,
and Bulmer-Thomas'(1982) study of The Central American Common Market.
17following the formation of the European Community coincided with a considerable inflow of US
direct investment, and several studies from the 1960s and 1970s asked whether the integration
process was the determining factor or not (see Yannopoulos 1990 for a survey of the literature).
The general conclusion of the debate was that the Common Market had attracted United States
investment which might otherwise have been located in other European countries. Thus, the
formation of the EC seems to have influenced the locational pattern of US direct investment
abroad and lured US firms to increase their activities in the European Community. This empirical
result is well in line with the theoretical hypotheses regarding effects of RIAs on inter-regional
FDI flows discussed above: economic integration is likely to make the region a more attractive
investment location for outside investors. 6
Studies of later stages in European integration have been more mixed in their findings
about the effects on inter-regional foreign direct investment. For example, Dunning (1992),
claims that the challenges of 1992 have led to a revitalization of US investment in the EC, while
Lipsey (1990) concluded that the changes in the location of fixed investment by  US
multinational firms after the announcement of the 1992 program were relatively small up through
1989. The upsurge in Japanese investment in Europe has also attracted much attention, and the
conclusion seems to be that those investments have increased as a consequence of the 1992
program, in response to both the opportunities and threats created by the integration process (see
e.g. Thomsen and Nicolaides, 1991 and Balasubramanyam and Greenaway, 1992).
Studies of the impact of economic integration on intra-regional investment are more rare
and generally constrained by data shortages. Some relatively crude studies by Franko (1976) and
Pelkmans (1984), focusing on the changes in the number of foreign manufacturing subsidiaries
of EC-firms established in other Community countries, found that European integration
coincided with a period of clear shifts in the location of production of multinationals of EC
6The  conclusions of the early studies often disagreed on the reasons for the increased US
investment in Europe -there was no consensus on whether the effects of integration operated
through the size of the market, its rate of growth, or the degree of tariff discrimination. To some
extent, the contradictory conclusions can be explained by the quality of the available data and
lack of proper statistical methods, but the disagreement also mirrors the elusive character of the
possible dynamic effects of regional integration. As noted in the theoretical section of this paper,
there is still no consensus regarding the significance and magnitude of these effects.
18parentage. In other words, these studies found signs of "investment diversion" in the
Kindleberger sense. A similar picture is suggested in a later study by Molle and Morsink (1991),
based on FDI flows between EC countries during the period 1975-1983. The study suggests that
intra-EC trade and intra-EC investment are complementary to each other, but only above a
certain level of trade intensity.
Most of the literature linking RIAs to foreign direct investment focuses on investment
effects for the region as a whole. Substantially less attention has been paid to the impact of RIAs
on the foreign direct investment outcomes for individual countries within the region. The few
earlier works focusing on individual countries include studies of the UK (e.g.  Mayes, 1983 and
Grant, 1983) and Ireland (O'Farrell, 1983). The results from these studies are mixed. While no
investment effects were found in the case of the UK, Ireland's membership of the EC stimulated
direct investment from both EC and non-EC sources. One possible explanation could be that
many foreign investors (particularly US firms) had entered the relatively open UK market
already during the 1950s and 1960s, before the country's accession to the EC, so that little
additional investment was necessary to respond to the new situation. In other words, the UK
experience might illustrate a case that would be classified in area 3 of Figure 1. Ireland, by
contrast, was not any major location for foreign investment prior to EC membership, and
integration provided good opportunities for exploiting the country's  locational advantages -this
would be an example where area 1 dominates. Winters (1996) notes another distinction between
Spain and Portugal, on the one hand, and Greece, on the other hand. Spain and Portugal benefited
from significant increases in inward FDI as a result of EC membership, but Greece did not,
largely because the country's  macroeconomic policies did not provide an attractive environment
for foreign investors. Hence, while Spain and Portugal can be classified as area 1 cases, Greece
may illustrate area 2: weak locational advantages obstructed the potentially beneficial investment
responses to Greek EC membership.
The studies of smaller countries integrating into larger economies are of particular
interest in this context. The investment experiences of small, open economies are arguably more
heavily influenced by international economic developments ( e.g. regional integration) than those
of relatively large economies such as the United States and the major EU member countries.
19Moreover, any new members of NAFTA or EU (such as Chile or the Eastern European
countries) will be relatively small economies joining a larger integrated region. Thus, the
relevant historical experience for potential new members in RIAs is that of small countries rather
than large ones. The choice of countries for the case studies has largely been conditioned by this
consideration.
3.2. North-North  Integration:  Canada in the CUSFTA
Largely at the behest of Canada, the Canada-US Free Trade Agreement (CUSFTA) was
negotiated over the 1986-1987 period. After a heated Canadian debate - including a federal
election with the free trade agreement as a major dividing line - the agreement was signed in
January 1988 and came into effect on January 1, 1989.7
The essence of the CUSFTA was the phased bilateral elimination of tariffs. In addition, a
number of provisions reduced discrimination against bilateral foreign direct investment,
including the extension of rights-of-establishment and national treatment. A range of prominent
sectors, such as basic telecommunications, was effectively excluded from coverage under the
investment liberalization provisions of the Agreement. Moreover, Canada's existing foreign
investment screening procedures were left in place (Globerman and Walker 1993). Nevertheless,
the thrust of the investment provisions of the CUSFTA was clearly to expand the legal scope for
bilateral direct investment. Moreover, the inclusion of a relatively robust dispute resolution
procedure arguably reduced the risks of either government acting in a discriminatory manner
towards investors from the other country. In terms of the first classification dimension of Figure
1 (i.e., the degree of environmental change resulting from the RIA) it seems reasonable to
characterize the Canadian position as an intermediate one, with moderate changes resulting from
the agreement. In this context, it should be remembered that bilateral trade between Canada and
7 The relatively long time lag between negotiation and implementation of the CUSFTA might
raise worries that large Canadian and US firms had anticipated the formal integration agreement,
and adjusted their investment positions already before it was implemented. However, it should be
noted that Canadian ratification of the CUSFTA was very much in doubt until the federal
election was concluded. We would, therefore, expect to see some evidence of a structural break
in Canadian and US direct investment data around 1988 or shortly thereafter, if the CUSFTA was
a significant influence on the Canadian direct investment environment.
20the US had been substantially liberalized well before the event studied here, through successive
GATT rounds as well as special bilateral agreements such as the Auto Pact and the Defense
Sharing Agreement. Regarding the second classification dimension of Figure 1 (the underlying
locational advantages of the country) it is also reasonable to place Canada in an intermediate
position, with, at best, mild locational advantages with respect to the US. Hence, we should
expect relatively moderate investment effects of the agreement.
Changes in Trade and Foreign Direct Investment Patterns
To the extent that CUSFTA significantly liberalized the North American trade environment, one
would expect to see bilateral trade between the United States and Canada becoming relatively
more important from 1988 onward. Moreover, to the extent that trade and foreign direct
investment are significantly related - either as substitutes, as suggested by models of tariff-
jumping FDI, or as complements, as implied by internalization theories  - one would also expect
to see changes in the relative importance of bilateral direct investment between the two countries.
Both series are reported in Table 1.8  Bilateral exports and imports refer to Canadian
imports from and exports to the US as a share of total Canadian trade, while bilateral direct
investment reflects the sum of US direct investment inflows to Canada and Canadian direct
investment outflows to the United States as a share of Canada's aggregate inward and outward
investment flows. It can be seen that bilateral trade has increased fairly steadily since 1988,
which indicates that trade liberalization has been effective. Bilateral direct investment has
increased since the early 1  990s. However, before that, the relative importance of bilateral direct
investment changed erratically, and it is difficult to discern a consistent pattern in FDI flows that
would clearly be related to the CUSFTA. 9
8~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
8The  discussion in connection with Table 1 and Table 2 is based on Blomstr6m, Globerman, and
Kokko (1996).
9 Since the data on investment flows include reinvested earnings, it is likely that the fluctuations
in these figures to some extent reflect cyclical fluctuations in profits.
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Bilateral Exports and Imports / Total Canadian Exports and Imports and
Bilateral Direct Investment / Total Canadian Inward and Outward FDI (percentages)
Year  Exports and  Direct Investment
Imports
1983  72.8  30.0
1984  74.3  58.6
1985  75.4  41.9
1986  73.6  30.0
1987  72.7  60.5
1988  71.8  39.5
1989  72.0  49.3
1990  72.0  41.2
1991  72.3  40.4
1992  74.3  41.0
1993  76.7  45.1
1994  78.3  65.9
1995  77.4  62.3
Source: Statistics Canada, Canada's Balance of International Payments
Ottawa: Ministry of Industry, various issues.
Table 2 presents an overview of the Canadian foreign direct investment pattern between
1986 and 1995. As above, bilateral inward and outward direct investment refer to US direct
investment inflows to Canada and Canadian direct investment outflows to the United States,
respectively. Other inward and outward direct investment refers to non-US direct investment
flows into Canada and Canadian direct investment flows to countries other than the United
States. The data in Table 2 suggest no easily identifiable linkage between the CUSFTA event and
subsequent changes in bilateral direct investment flows. While there are substantial changes in
FDI flows for individual years, the overall magnitude of bilateral direct investment was relatively
stable (decreasing slightly in nominal terms) over the period 1988-1992. Substantial increases in
the nominal value of inward direct investment from the United States emerged in 1993 and
continued through 1995, while the nominal value of outward direct investment to the United
States increased in 1994 and 1995 - but only back to levels experienced in the mid-1980s. It is
unlikely that these increases in investment flows are directly related to the CUSFTA, since they
22emerged in 1993, well after the implementation of CUSFTA, and coincided with a general boom
in outward FDI flows from the US at that time (see UN 1995). Furthermore, it is suggestive that
a substantial decline in the value of the Canadian dollar began in 1992 following five years
during which the Canadian dollar strengthened against its US counterpart. This decline in the
value of the Canadian dollar may well have constituted an important motive for the increased US
investments in the country (see Aliber 1978 for theoretical arguments).
Table 2
Inward and Outward Foreign Direct Investment  for  Canada
(millions of Canadian dollars)  *
Bilateral  Other
Year  Inward  Outward  Inward  Outward
1983  29  1686  2438  1558
1984  3196  3209  2960  1563
1985  -191  3144  1965  2130
1986  -743  3362  4607  1502
1987  6028  7278  4632  4044
1988  2052  2963  5899  1775
1989  2091  3510  3850  1918
1990  3246  2800  5917  2722
1991  1961  1925  1187  4553
1992  2719  1315  2673  3144
1993  5308  968  1117  6522
1994  7279  2456  960  4070
1995  10229  3570  5122  2996
Source:  Statistics Canada, Canada's Balance of lnternational Payments,
Ottawa: Ministry of Industry, various issues
* Net flows including reinvested earnings accruing to direct investors.
Inward direct investment from countries other than the United States exhibits no
consistent pattern over the period studied, although the largest inflows took place between 1988
and 1990, right after the implementation of the CUSFTA. Certainly there is no consistent
evidence of any lasting diversion of foreign direct investment flows to Canada in response to
CUSFTA. However, there is an interesting pattern in the development of Canadian outward
23direct investment to countries other than the United States. Until 1990, Canadian outward FDI
was primarily directed to the US, but the early 1990s saw a significant decrease in the relative
importance of the United States as a destination for Canadian outward direct investment. This
decreasing share of outward FDI destined for the US is mirrored by an increasing share
(beginning in 1991) going to EU member countries other than the United Kingdom, and an even
more dramatically increasing share going to regions other than the EU, the United States and
Japan. The profitable opportunities encouraging a redirection of Canadian direct investment
outflows presumably had nothing to do with CUSFTA. However, CUSFTA may have played an
important role in that it guaranteed access to the US market, so that available FDI resources
could instead be utilized to establish Canadian presence in other markets.
As a complement to the flow data on FDI, Tables 3 and 4 present some recently
published data on the gross product of US foreign affiliates in Canada and Canadian affiliates in
the United States. Table 3 focuses on the role of foreign affiliates in the Canadian economy. The
second column of the table measures the share of US majority-owned foreign affiliates in
Canadian GDP. The US share has fallen from well over 11 percent in the early 1980s to about 8
percent in the early 1990s. Coupled with the observation that bilateral trade with Canada has
increased as a result of the CUSFTA, this suggests that regional integration has resulted in FDI
becoming a relatively less important mode for US firms to serve the Canadian market.
Table 3.
Foreign Firms' Shares of Canadian GDP 1977-1993 (percent).
Year  US  Affiliates  in Canada/  All Foreign  Firms  in Canada/
Canadian  GDP  Canadian  GDP
1977  13.8  n.a.
1982  11.3  n.a.
1983  n.a.  16.2
1988  n.a.  15.6
1989  9.5  n.a.
1990  8.8  14.8
1991  8.0  n.a.
1992  7.9  14.3
1993  8.2  15.1
24Sources:  Mataloni  and Goldberg  (1994),  Mataloni  (1995),  Fahim-Nader  and Zeile (1995),
Lipsey,  Blomstrom,  and Ramstetter  (1995),  and World  Tables.
In other words,  there is some  indication  that trade  has substituted  for inward  FDI from the
US. Another  indication  of the same  development  is that Canada's  share  of US MNCs' foreign
production  has fallen significantly  since  the implementation  of the CUSFTA.  The ratio of US
affiliates' production  in Canada  to the aggregate  production  of all US affiliates  abroad  fell from
16.3  percent in 1989  to 12.6  percent  in 1993.
At the same time,  it appears  that Canada  has become  a somewhat  more attractive
investment  location  for outsiders.  The last column  of Table 3 shows  that aggregate  output share
of all foreign  affiliates  has remained  roughly  constant,  at about 15  percent of Canadian  GDP,
which  indicates  that other  foreign  investors  have made  up for the reduction  of the US share of
Canadian  production.
Table 4 shows  the data on foreign  affiliates'  shares  of US output since 1988.  It can be
seen that the share  of Canadian  affiliates  has fallen  slightly  since  the start of the CUSFTA,  from
0.7 percent in 1988  to 0.6 percent  in 1994,  while  the aggregate  share  of all foreign  firms has
increased  from 3.9 percent  in 1988  to over 4.6 percent in 1993.10  The largest  increases  in the
GDP shares  of foreign  firms  seem  to have  taken place  in connection  with the implementation  of
the agreement,  in 1988  and 1989.  These data suggest  a similar  development  as in the Canadian
case: regional  integration  seems  to have  reduced  the motives  for intra-regional  FDI, but
stimulated  inflows of FDI from the rest of the world.  Comparing  the Canadian  and US
experiences,  it also appears  that the effects  on FDI are not evenly  distributed.  For Canada,  the net
result appears  to be close to zero,  where increased  inter-regional  inflows  barely  make up for
reduced  intra-regional  investment.  In the US case,  there seems  to be a positive  net effect, with the
increases  in FDI inflows  from the rest of the world dominating  the reduced  Canadian  shares.
1°  Data are not available  for the period before 1998,  which  means  that any conclusions  regarding
the relation  between  these changes  and the establishment  of CUSFTA  should  be treated  with
caution.
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Foreign Firms'Shares  of US GDP, 1988-1993 (percent).
Year  Canadian Affiliates  in the US /  All Foreign  Firms in the US  I
US GDP  US GDP
1988  0.72.  3.89
1989  0.69  4.25
1990  0.69  4.31
1991  0.69  4.50
1992  0.57  4.42
1993  0.65  4.58
1994  0.62  n.a.
Sources: See Table 3.
Summary and Conclusions from North-North Integration
Canada offers a potentially instructive case study of the impacts of a RIA on foreign direct
investment flows for a small open economy. Since economic theory makes no compelling case
for a strong linkage between RIAs and FDI patterns for individual countries, and since the
environmental change connected with the CUSFTA was not dramatic, it is hardly surprising that
the pattern of overall foreign direct investment into and out of Canada over the past years does
not suggest a strong and consistent influence of the agreement. Our observations suggest a
reduction in the relative importance of FDI as mode of international business between Canada
and the United States, arguably caused by the liberalization of bilateral trade, and a concurrent
increase in the inflows of FDI from the rest of the world, presumably because the CUSFTA made
Canada a more attractive investment location for outsiders. The net impact on investment in
Canada remains indeterminate.
To be sure, the foregoing observation does not permit a conclusion that trade
liberalization has historically had no significant influence on direct investment patterns in
Canada. As noted earlier, much of the bilateral trade between Canada and the United States had
been liberalized well before the establishment of the CUSFTA. Moreover, it is possible that a
more formal, multivariate analysis would identify a significant influence of CUSFTA that is
obscured by the relatively simple evaluation of direct investment patterns described above.
26Nevertheless, the Canadian experiences serve as a caution against anticipating substantial direct
investment impacts for smaller economies joining RIAs.
3.3 North-South  Integration: Mexico and NAFTA
Shortly after the establishment of the Canada-US Free Trade Agreement, Canada and the United
States initiated negotiations with Mexico about a possible southern expansion of the integration
agreement. In December 1992, the three countries signed the North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA). This agreement, which came into effect on January 1, 1994, was the first
formal regional integration agreement involving both a developing and developed countries. In
essence, the NAFTA is an extended version of the CUSFTA. In addition to the trade and
investment liberalization measures introduced already in the CUSFTA, the new treaty includes
major advances in areas such as government procurement (where coverage is extended to
services and construction) and intellectual property and investor's rights (introducing binding
investor-state arbitration), as well as more stringent rules of origin (see e.g. Hufbauer and Schott
1993 for details).
The overall effects on Mexico of a free trade arrangement with Canada and the United
States are expected to be significant, for several reasons. One important determinant is Mexico's
geographical location. In the 1  970s, many Mexicans considered it to be a drawback to be "so far
from heaven and so close to the United States". Today, when regional trade and investment
barriers have been reduced as a result of the NAFTA, the situation is different. The North
American share of Mexican exports has increased from around 70 percent in the late 1980s to
over 86 percent in 1995, as shown in Table 5..
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Mexican Exports and Imports 1986-1995 (Million USD; percent of total exports and imports in
parentheses. )
Exports  Imports
Year  Total  US + Canada  Other Western  Total  US + Canada  Other Western
Hemisphere  Hemisphere
1986  19,074  13,928  1,120  14,749  10,666  423
(73.0)  (5.9)  (72.3)  (2.9)
1987  20,532  13,577  1,589  12,758  8,626  379
(66.1)  (7.7)  (67.6)  (3.0)
1988  20,409  13,726  1,482  19,557  13,401  738
(67.3)  (7.3)  (68.5)  (3.8)
1989  22,975  16,364  1,496  22,789  15,911  930
(71.2)  (6.5)  (69.8)  (4.1)
1990  26,247  18,711  1,589  29,556  20,236  1,252
(71.3)  (6.1)  (68.5)  (4.2)
1991  27,101  19,523  1,681  38,121  26,825  1,587
(72.0)  (6.2)  (70.4)  (4.2)
1992  46,153  38,278  2,305  61,914  46,522  2,236
(82.9)  (5.0)  (75.1)  (3.6)
1993  51,832  44,474  2,554  65,188  49,284  2,320
(85.8)  (4.9)  (75.6)  (3.6)
1994  60,459  52,588  2,819  79,198  56,371  2,831
(87.0)  (4.7)  (71.2)  (3.6)
1995  79,324  68,388  4,028  73,938  56,344  2,032
(86.2)  (5.1)  (76.2)  (2.7)
Source: UN Trade Tapes
The value of Mexican exports more than quadrupled over the same period as a result of the
increasing sales to North America, with the largest increases occurring during the last four years.
The North American share of Mexican imports has also grown over this period, but not quite as
dramatically
Another reason to expect positive implications of the free trade arrangement for the
Mexican economy is related to the significant policy changes that have taken place in recent
28years. Traditionally, Mexico has been a closed economy. In the mid-1980s, however, important
market-oriented reforms were introduced in several sectors, and the economy began to open up.
As a consequence of the NAFTA, the reform process has been "locked in" and extended to other
sectors, such as autos, textiles and apparel, finance, telecommunications, and land transportation
(see Hufbauer and Schott 1993). The coincidence of policy reforms, distinct locational
advantages in the form of cheap labor, and free access to a substantial part of the Canadian and
US markets, is very likely to promote economic growth in Mexico. In terms of Figure 1, it is
reasonable to characterize the Mexican participation in the NAFTA as an example of a country in
area 1.
It is quite clear that foreign multinationals have noted and reacted on the recent changes in
Mexico. As shown in Table 6 below, the inflows of FDI have risen significantly since the late
1980s, from less than USD 3 billion to nearly USD 8 billion in 1994.
Table 6
Foreign Direct Investment Flows into Mexico (USD million)
Year  1989  1990  1991  1992  1993  1994
FDI inflows  2,785  2,549  4,742  4,393  4,389  7,978
Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics (various issues).
Since US multinationals dominate the FDI scene in Mexico it is relevant to look
specifically at their responses to the NAFTA agreement. Table 7 suggest that US firms have
expanded their presence in Mexico, but that much of the investment increase took place before
the formal discussions about NAFTA began. The US FDI position in Mexico has not increased
much since 1992, and the share of Mexico in total US investment abroad has actually declined
during the past years. This indicates that outsiders account for the bulk of the recent inflows of
FDI to Mexico. To some extent, these investments are probably directed to the local market, in
response to the country's  improving economic and institutional environment, but the investment
flows are also likely to reflect some degree of  investment diversion and investment creation. To
the extent that Mexico has become a relatively more important supplier to the US market through
29trade creation or trade diversion, foreign multinationals are likely to respond by increasing their
productive capacity in Mexico.
Table 7
US Direct Investment Position in Mexico on a Historical-Cost Basis at Yearend, 1992-1995
(Million USD; percent of total US  foreign direct investment position in parentheses)
Year  1987  1992  1993  1994  1995
US FDI Stock  4,900  13,730  15,229  15,714  14,037
(2.73)  (2.72)  (2.53)  (1.97)
Sources: Survey of Current Business, Vol. 75, No. 8, August 1995, and Lowe and Bargas
(1996).
Moreover, the timing and character of the changes in the US investment position suggest
that NAFTA has perhaps not been the main determinant of the upswing in US investments in
Mexico. An equally important stimulus must have been the comprehensive reforms of the
country's FDI regulation that commenced already in the mid-1980s and eventually culminated
with the NAFTA. The Mexican regulatory framework for FDI, which dated back to 1973, was
very restrictive and served as a disincentive for investment from abroad (Blomstr6m 1989). In
the backwash of the Mexican debt crisis, these regulations where changed dramatically in 1989
to attract foreigners to invest in Mexico. It appears that US investors responded quite strongly to
this first round of reforms. A few years later, the investment regime was further liberalized
through the NAFTA (see Gestrin and Rugman 1994 for details). Among others advances, the
agreement established a clear, rules-based framework for the impartial treatment of FDI and
placed strict limits on the use of performance requirements. It also established dispute-settlement
mechanisms specifically designed to deal with investment issues. The US response was relatively
mild this time, since many US firms were already in place (and because the agreement
guaranteed their access to the Mexican market anyway), but investors from outside the region
perceived Mexico as a much more attractive investment location than before.
When it comes to the effects of foreign investment in Mexico, there is some evidence that
multinational firms have played an important role in opening up the country to foreign trade, by
30converting import-substituting industries into exporting (Blomstrkm and Lipsey, 1993). The
rapid expansion of the maquiladoras, where foreign firms play an important role, has also
speeded up the trade liberalization process (Kagami 1996). However, the main contribution of
the presence of foreign firms presumably comes from technology transfer and technology
spillovers (Blomstrom 1989). The Mexican economy seems to have reached a level of
development and skills where local firms are able to absorb some of the new technology that is
imported and used by foreign multinational firms (see Kokko 1994, Blomstrbm, Lipsey and
Zejan 1994, and Borensztein, De Gregorio and Lee 1995). This means that the foreign owned
multinationals operating in Mexico may well act as catalysts in bringing about the kind of
dynamic growth effects that have been discussed in connection with the European Single Market
program.
Summary and Conclusion  from North-South Integration
The experience of Mexico suggests that North-South integration may be greatly beneficial for the
Southern  partners, and illustrates some of the prerequisites for achieving these beneficial effects.
Firstly, membership in the NAFTA coincided with other reforms that liberalized the institutional
framework of the country.  Hence, the RIA contributed to a very significant and positive
environmental change. Secondly, Mexico possesses strong locational advantages with respect to
its northern neighbors. These are made up of increasingly market oriented economic policies,
geographical proximity, and cheap labor. Consequently, regional integration has been connected
to significant increases in the inflows of foreign investment, in particular from countries outside
the NAFTA region. In other words, Mexico is a good example of a country that would be
classified in area 1 in our template of possible outcomes of regional integration.
3.4 South-South Integration: MERCOSUR
Regional integration in the Western Hemisphere has a history before both CUSFTA and
NAFTA. The first attempts date back to 1960, when a number of South American countries and
Mexico created the Latin American Free Trade Association (LAFTA). The same year, the seven
countries in Central America created the Central American Common Market, and in 1969,
31Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela formed the Andean Pact. The main purpose of
all these RIAs was to create a larger market, to facilitate the import substituting development
policy followed during that period. However, all of these integration efforts failed, since little
effort was made to liberalize trade.
Regional integration in the Southern Cone is of a later date. A bilateral agreement between
Argentina and Brazil, which stipulated the elimination of all trade barriers over a ten-year period,
was initiated in 1986. Five years later, this agreement was extended under the Treaty of
Asuncion, with the purpose of creating a Southern Cone Common Market. The resulting
agreement, known as MERCOSUR, also includes Paraguay and Uruguay as members. Intra-
regional trade has gradually been liberalized since the early 1990s. A Customs Union was
established on January 1, 1995, with free trade in (most) goods among the four member countries
and a Common External Tariff (CET) for trade with third countries (see Laird 1995). The CET
has 11 tariff levels varying from 0 to 20 percent, but some important product groups, like
automobiles, telecommunications, and computer equipment, are excluded from the agreement.
However, it should be noted that the integration process has not led to an across-the-board
reduction of external tariffs for all countries. On the contrary, in several product groups, the CET
is a compromise between countries with domestic import-substituting producers (who start out
with high tariffs that are reduced as a result of integration) and countries without domestic
production (where low initial trade barriers have been raised). In some cases, such as the region's
automobile industry, it is even appropriate to talk about a general increase in the external trade
barriers as a result of the integration process.
In addition to the trade arrangements, a partially new investment regime has also been
established to promote and protect investment in the MERCOSUR region (IDB 1996b). For
example, the Colonia and Buenos Aires Protocols from 1994 grant national treatment to intra-
regional investments and eliminate most restrictions on capital and profit remittances. However,
the most important changes in this area had occurred already before the start of multilateral
liberalization under the colors of MERCOSUR, at least in the two larger member countries. In
Argentina, the FDI legislation was fundamentally changed in 1976, to guarantee foreign firms
essentially the same rights and obligations as national firms. The new laws also allowed
32capitalization of intangible assets and unlimited capital repatriation and profit remittances
abroad. As of 1993, restrictions on FDI remained only in the broadcasting and atomic energy
sectors (Agosin 1995). The liberalization of the Brazilian investment legislation has not been
equally far-reaching, but it should be noted that Brazil never adopted any comprehensive statute
regulating foreign investment, nor established any commission or agency to screen foreign
investment (Rosenn 1991). Yet, the Brazilian reforms during the 1990s include a significant
liberalization of the rules for technology transfer, exports and imports, financial transactions, and
other areas that affect the foreign investment climate (see Muchlinski 1995 for details).
Looking at the reforms of the trade and investment rules in the MERCOSUR region during
the past decade, it is clear that there have been significant changes, although it is uncertain how
much of the reforms should be credited to the formal integration agreement. As noted above,
there are areas where unilateral liberalization has been important, and other field where reforms
are mainly related to multilateral initiatives, such as the GATT. Yet, in terms of the classification
dimensions of Figure 1, it is clear that the environmental changes connected to the MERCOSUR
process have been strong. Regarding the investment environment, it can be argued that the
MERCOSUR region has notable locational advantages in several industries, stemming from a
large common market, abundant natural resources and relatively cheap labor. Considering the
remaining barriers to inter-regional trade, these advantages apply in particular for production
aiming at the regional market. Hence, in aggregate, the MERCOSUR provides another
illustration of a RIA that should be classified in area 1 of Figure 1, which suggests that we
should expect relatively strong investment effects for the region as a whole. The impact on
individual countries may, of course, differ from this presumption, depending on the national
locational advantages and the initial trade and investment structure.
Changes in Trade and Foreign Direct Investment Patterns
The effects of the trade liberalization in the Southern Cone are evident from Table 8. During the
first half of the 1990s, intra-MERCOSUR exports as a share of the region's  total exports more
than doubled, to reach nearly 20 percent in 1994.
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External Trade of MERCOSUR, 1988-1994 (Million USD and percent)
1988  1989  1990  1991  1992  1993  1994
Total Exports
(USD million)  44,829  46,555  46,433  45,911  50,487  54,085  62,027
Intra-MERCOSUR
Exports (percent)  6.5  8.2  8.9  11.1  14.3  18.6  19.3
Total Imports
(USD million)  23,076  26,061  29,302  34,264  40,649  48,509  62,422
Intra-MERCOSUR
Imports (percent)  13.3  15.1  14.5  15.5  18.4  19.6  19.6
Source: Laird  (1995)
Intra-regional imports as a share of total imports increased significantly as well, from 13.3
percent in 1988 to 19.6 percent in 1994. It should be remembered that these changes refer to the
period immediately before the establishment of the MERCOSUR Customs Union in 1995, and
that the shares of intra-regional trade are likely to have increased further since then. Yet, the
liberalization of intra-regional trade has been a gradual process, and most of the reforms in this
area had already been completed by late 1994 (see also Behar 1996).
At an aggregate level, it does not appear that the expansion of intra-regional trade is
attributable mainly to trade diversion, since the value of imports from the rest of the world more
than doubled during the period. A recent study by Yeats (1996), however, suggests that trade
diversion may still be significant. He finds that the most rapidly growing product groups in intra-
MERCOSUR trade are capital-intensive goods that members have not been able to export
competitively to outside markets. In particular, there has been a rapid increase in intra-regional
trade in transport equipment, as a result of tariff increases vis-a-vis the rest of the world and
regulations of the bilateral automobile trade within the MERCOSUR. We will return to this issue
below.
There is also a renewed interest in the MERCOSUR on the part of foreign investors. The
inflow of foreign direct investment into the region more than tripled between 1989 and 1993, as
shown in Table 9. Argentina and Brazil have been the favored localizations for FDI, while
34Uruguay and, particularly, Paraguay, have been lagging behind. Unfortunately, there are no
aggregate data available to analyze FDI flows for the period after the establishment of the
Customs Union in 1995.
Table 9
Foreign Direct Investment Flows into MERCOSUR Members (Million USD)
Year  Argentina  Brazil  Paraguay  Uruguay
1989  1,028  1,131  12.8  37.7
1990  1,836  989  76.3  38.6
1991  2,439  1,103  83.1  30.3
1992  4,179  2,061  42.0  n.a.
1993  6,305  1,292  50.0  101.5
1994  n.a.  3,072  n.a.  170.0
Source: IMF: International Financial Statistics.
However, looking at home country data for the major foreign investor in the region, the
United States, it appears that the real boom of FDI did not occur until after this event. Table 10
shows that in 1995 alone, the US stock of FDI in the region increased by more than 25 percent,
which is significantly higher than the growth rate of US investment in the rest of the world. It
should, therefore, be noted that we risk underestimating the investment responses to the
MERCOSUR by restricting the analysis to the period for which data are available.
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US Direct Investment Position in the MERCOSUR on a Historical-Cost Basis at Yearend, 1992-
1995. (Million USD; shares of total US  foreign direct investment position in parentheses.)
1992  1993  1994  1995
Argentina  3,327  4,331  5,945  7,962
(0.66)  (0.77)  (0.96)  (1.12)
Brazil  16,313  16,822  18,798  23,590
(3.25)  (3.01)  (3.03)  (3.31)
MERCOSURa)  19,640  21,153  24,743  31,552
(3.91)  (3.78)  (3.99)  (4.43)
a) Excluding Paraguay and Uruguay, for which no data are available.
Source: Survey of Current Business, Vol. 75, No. 8, August 1995, and Lowe and Bargas  (1996).
The aggregate data do not distinguish between intra- and inter-regional investment flows,
but the increases in the investment position of the United States, shown in Table 10, suggest that
a significant share of the inflows come from outside the MERCOSUR. It is also obvious that the
increases in FDI flows have occurred at different times in the individual countries, which may
indicate that foreign capital has been attracted by other factors than regional integration. This
motivates a closer look at the individual countries.
Argentina registered the largest increases in FDI inflows before 1994, and there is reason to
expect that much of this was unrelated to the regional integration process. Chudnovsky, L6pez,
and Porta (1995) suggest three major explanations for the increases in foreign investment in
Argentina since the early 1990s. The most important attraction for foreign investors was arguably
Argentina's comprehensive privatization program, which opened several public service
industries to foreign investment. Several public companies in the telecommunications and
transportation sector were sold to foreign investors
Another important determinant was the country's successful macroeconomic reforms,
which managed to tring down public deficits, inflation, and interest rates, and ensured the
convertibility of the currency. Unlike the present situation in Europe, where the members of the
EU are obliged to fulfill certain macroeconomic "convergence criteria", economic integration in
the form of MERCOSUR was not a motive for Argentinean macroeconomic stabilization. A
36third factor influencing foreign investors was the new wave of protectionism in the region's  auto
sector in the early 1990s (see Frischtak, Leipziger, and Normand 1996). In 1991, Argentina
introduced a system of quotas on imports of finished automobiles, which contributed to an
increase in foreign investment inflows to the sector. In this context, it is important to note that the
auto sector's external trade barriers have not been reduced as a result of the RIA. On the
contrary, in 1994, Brazil raised its tariffs on automobiles imported from non-MERCOSUR
countries from 20 to 70 percent, and bilateral agreements between the MERCOSUR countries
grant preferential treatment to companies with assembly plants in the customs union (see
Chudnovsky, L6pez, and Porta 1996).
In the short run, it is likely that the effects of increased FDI inflows on the Argentinean
economy will remain limited. For instance, the impact on the diversification and expansion of
exports has been relatively modest so far, since a large part of the foreign investment has taken
place in the nontradable sectors, in connection with the privatization of public services. In the
long run, however, we should expect positive effects of these investment, since the efficiency of
public services is likely to improve and strengthen the country's international competitiveness. In
the auto sector, by contrast, it is apparent that the recent FDI inflows have contributed
significantly to technology transfer and modernization, but the long-run effects on the country's
competitiveness and welfare remain questionable. As in other cases of import substitution,
protectionism distorts the allocation of scarce resources and allows local producers to operate
less efficiently than foreign competitors.
The foreign investment in Brazil has fluctuated widely during the past years, and the
inflows of FDI have fallen well short of those to Argentina, although the Brazilian market is
about four times larger. One reason is that market-oriented reforms were introduced later and
macroeconomic stabilization was achieved later in Brazil than in the other countries in the
region. Consequently, the positive prospects connected with regional integration were tempered
by an unpredictable macroeconomic environment. However, the recent years have witnessed
successful reforms and stabilization in Brazil as well and the inflows of FDI have increased
markedly. For instance, Brazil replaced Argentina as the favored MERCOSUR location for US
direct investment in 1994 and 1995 (see Table 10). The strong locational advantages of Brazil -
37in terms of its large market and supply of labor and natural resources - suggest that we should
expect substantial inflows of foreign investment in the medium run, assuming that the country's
macroeconomic environment remains stable.
The experiences of the two smaller countries in the region, Paraguay and Uruguay, are
mixed. While the flows of FDI to Uruguay seem to have increased, there is no clear trend for
Paraguay. Uruguay is arguably more attractive for foreign investors because of its geographical
location between Brazil and Argentina, while the locational advantages of Paraguay are weaker.
In both cases, foreign investment can be expected to be directed to industries where economies of
scale are not important -industries relying on scale economies are more likely to locate in either
Argentina or Brazil, where they can benefit from proximity to larger consumer markets.
However, neither Uruguay nor Paraguay is likely to be influenced greatly by static
investment effects. Instead, their benefits of economic integration are likely to derive from
possible dynamic effects, that lead to growth and increased demand for their exports in the entire
MERCOSUR region. It is also possible that economic integration will have a stabilizing impact
on the political and macroeconomic environment in both countries, in the sense that radical
policy changes are less likely because of the commitments to the neighboring countries.
Summary and Conclusionsfrom  South-South Integration
Given that the MERCOSUR Customs Union was not established until 1995, it is obvious that it
is too early to detect even the static effects of that specific RIA on foreign investment. Yet, less
ambitious forms of regional integration have been pursued by the MERCOSUR countries since
the mid-  1  980s, so that much of the intra-regional trade had been liberalized in 1994, and it is
possible to draw some tentative conclusions from the region's experience to date. The following
generalizations are suggested by the analysis above.
First, macroeconomic stability appears to be a more important determinant of FDI inflows
than is regional integration. Both the Argentinean and Brazilian experiences illustrate that
foreign investors have responded stronger to successful stabilization programs than to the early
stages of the MERCOSUR project. Second, comprehensive integration, as in the case of the
MERCOSUR Customs Union, may stimulate significant investment responses. In our data, this
38has mainly been illustrated by the changes in the US investment position in the region between
1994 and 1995, but there are indications that investors from other countries have also reacted
strongly, as discussed above. Third, the inflows of FDI to the region are not likely to be
distributed equally to all participating countries. It is reasonable to assume that Argentina and
Brazil possess relatively strong locational advantages and will be the main beneficiaries of
increased FDI inflows in the short to medium run. Finally, as illustrated by the development in
the MERCOSUR auto sector, it is not evident that the welfare effects of all FDI increases will be
positive. To the extent that regional integration contributes to increased distortions, e.g. in the
form of higher tariff barriers or market sharing agreements between oligopolistic producers, it is
possible that the resulting inefficient allocation of resources outweighs the various benefits of
FDI inflows, such as technology spillovers.
4. Summary and Conclusions
The relation between regional integration agreements and foreign direct investment is neither
self-evident nor straightforward, as illustrated by the first part of this paper. In our attempt to set
up a conceptual framework for thinking about the impact of RIAs on FDI flows, we touched
upon several characteristics of countries and investors that contribute to the confusion
surrounding the issue. For instance, the effects of agreements between developed countries
(North-North RLAs)  may differ from integration between developing countries (South-South
RIAs) or agreements between countries at different levels of development (North-South RIAs),
depending on how competitive and complementary the economies are, and how much integrating
there is at the outset. Regional integration is likely to have different effects on investors from the
participating economies and outside investors, particularly if the agreements are discriminatory
in the sense that significant trade barriers against the rest of the world remain after regional trade
is opened up. Sectors and industries where national firms are relatively weak may experience
larger inflows of FDI than sectors where strong local firms are well positioned to exploit new
investment opportunities. The impact may also vary depending on the character of FDI projects.
Horizontal and vertical investment, or import-substituting and export-oriented investment, are
39not likely to be affected in the same manner by the elimination of regional trade and investment
restrictions.
A host of other distinctions between countries, investors, and integration agreements
could be added to the discussion. However, a more detailed list would hardly change the
conclusion from our theoretical discussion, namely, that economic theory does not provide any
general prediction regarding the impact of RIAs on foreign investment decision. For this reason,
we proposed an eclectic approach for examining the impact of regional integration on individual
countries or industries. A first step should be an assessment of how significant is the
environmental change brought about by the RIA, and how strong are the locational advantages of
the industry or country in question. The stronger the environmental change and the stronger the
locational advantages of the individual industry, the more likely it is that the RIA will lead to
inflows of FDI from the outside as well as from the rest of the integrating region (see Figure 1).
This first estimation should then be complemented with a closer analysis of trade and investment
patterns before the RIA (to identify the reasons for existing FDI and to determine how much
adjustment would be needed to reach the new equilibrium) and the competitive strength of local
and foreign firms (to determine who is most likely to exploit the opportunities presented by the
enlarged regional market). Hence, specifying the exact relation between RIAs and FDI is
essentially an empirical question.
The three cases presented in the second part of the paper highlighted some of the cross-
country differences in the investment effects of regional integration. The first case focused on the
Canadian participation in the CUSFTA, and illustrated a situation where the RIA did not appear to
cause any radical changes in the inflows of FDI to the country in question. The main reasons for the
moderate impact of the CUSFTA are probably that the environmental change connected with the
agreement was not dramatic (since trade between Canada and the US was already relatively free
due to GATT commitments and various bilateral treaties) and that there was already considerable
cross-investment between the two countries. Yet, there were some indications of a reduction in the
relative importance of FDI in the bilateral relation between Canada and the United States,
because of the reduction of remaining trade barriers, and a concurrent increase in the inflows of
FDI to Canada from the rest of the world, presumably because the RIA made Canada a more
40attractive investment location for outsiders. The relatively modest investment response to this
specific RIA may well be a general characteristic of many North-North agreements, where the
trade and investment regimes are relatively open and markets are defacto  integrated already
before the formal RIA.
The second case examined the impact of the NAFTA agreement on foreign investment in
Mexico, and suggested that this specific RIA has had a profound impact on the inflows of FDI.
There are several reasons for this impact. Firstly, the establishment of the NAFTA coincided
with and deepened other reforms that liberalized the institutional framework of the country.
Hence, the agreement contributed to very significant and positive environmental changes: an
added bonus is that these are likely to be perceived as more permanent improvements in the
investment environment than purely domestic reforms. Secondly, due to its increasingly market
oriented economic policies, geographical proximity, and supply of cheap labor, Mexico
possesses strong locational advantages in labor-intensive industries with respect to its northern
neighbors. Consequently, regional integration has created an abundance of new commercial
opportunities for domestic and foreign investors, in the domestic Mexican market as well as in
the US and Canadian markets. The response has been a significant increase in the inflows of
foreign investment, in particular from countries outside the NAFTA region. The Mexican
experience is likely to capture some general characteristics of North-South agreements, primarily
related to the potential for improved policy credibility and gains from guaranteed access to large
northern markets.
The third case examined the impact of regional integration in the Southern Cone, involving
Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay. Although the MERCOSUR Customs Union was not
formally established until the beginning of 1995, we argued that it should be possible to discern
some effects of integration in this region: a gradual liberalization of intra-regional trade
commenced in 1991, and most internal trade barriers had been removed by 1994. The available
evidence, although patchy, show that a strong investment expansion has coincided with this
integration process, and it is reasonable to assume that comprehensive integration, as in the case
of the MERCOSUR Customs Union, may stimulate further significant investment responses.
However, the inflows of FDI to the integrating region are not likely to be distributed equally to
41all participating countries. In the case of the MERCOSUR, it is reasonable to assume that
Argentina and Brazil possess relatively strong locational advantages and will be the main
beneficiaries of  increased FDI inflows in the short to medium run. There is also an important
caveat that may be relevant for many other instances of South-South RIAs. Macroeconomic
stability appears to have been a more important determinant of FDI inflows to countries like
Argentina and Brazil than is regional integration: both the Argentinean and Brazilian experiences
illustrate that foreign investors have responded stronger to successful stabilization programs than
to the early stages of the MERCOSUR project. Finally, the structure of the MERCOSUR
agreement - with some sectors like autos and telecommunication, where controls and trade
barriers have been raised rather than reduced - suggests another important caveat. It is not
evident that the welfare effects of all FDI increases stimulated by regional integration agreements
will be positive. To the extent that regional integration contributes to increased distortions, e.g. in
the form of higher external trade barriers or market sharing agreements between oligopolistic
producers, it is possible that the resulting inefficiencies will outweigh the various potential
benefits of increased FDI inflows.
This brings us to some of the limitations of the present paper. The analysis has focused on
the impact of RIAs on FDI flows, but the more general welfare effects have not been discussed in
detail, neither for the integrating region nor for the world at large. Moreover, we have
concentrated on ownership issues, interpreting FDI flows as changes in the ownership of
production factors. Future research should of course consider welfare effects in closer detail, and
also take into account factors that determine production location rather than ownership issues
alone. Regarding the empirical cases, the discussion has mainly concerned the effects on entire
countries, and developments in individual sectors and industries have not been addressed in
sufficient detail. However, the conceptual framework presented in the paper suggests that the
impact of RIAs is likely to differ between countries and industries, and more detailed sectoral
studies are clearly called for.
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